One of the most influential versions of the evidential argument from evil was put forth by contemporary American philosopher William Rowe. He believes that frequency of evils and certain particular instances of evil in the world provide a rational context of evidence against theism. In contrast, critics try to uncover flaws in his argument. Rowe dismisses many of these critiques as apologetic and ineffective, believing that theodicies such as John Hick’s “cultivation of the soul” fail to justify why arbitrary evils occur. In this study, we seek an answer for the following question: are William Rowe’s critiques of John Hick’s theodicy rational enough? To see this, we provide a rough account of the evidential argument from evil and John Hick’s theodicy, and finally show that while Hick’s theodicy fails to establish some of its grounds such as the belief in resurrection and is founded upon principles such as reincarnation, Rowe’s critiques do not undermine the ability of this theodicy to justify arbitrary evils.

By introducing evidential argument, William Rowe opened a new chapter in discussions about problem of evil. Rowe’ s first formulation of the problem based on the idea that because “ it appears” that some evils in the world are gratuitous then they are indeed so. The most influential critique of Rowe’ s argument is Stephen Wykstra’ sthat is based on the epistemological principle which is called CORNEA. He shows that in the Rowe’ s assumed situation we are not permitted to pass from “ it appears” to “ is” . According to CORNEA, considering evidence Xwe areentitled to say it appears that p, only if p were not the case, probably X was different in a discernable way. The goal of this paper is firstly to introduce CORNEA as an answer to the problem of gratuitous evil, then introduce and assesse some selected critiques ofCORNEA and to defencethe principle and finally compare between skeptical theism-that CORNEA is an instance of – and approaches of Islamic thinkers to the problem of evil.

One of the most important evidences of the atheists on the incompatibility of the system of the theist's beliefs throughout the history is the problem of evil. According to the special description of this problem presented by William Rowe – one of the contemporary atheists – there are some evils in this world which cannot be justified or explained by the reasons the believers present to explain them. Rowe improved his argument – after receiving some answers and critics – throughout a couple of decades and in his last description of this problem, he tried to strengthen his reasoning by explaining and updating its premises and presenting two examples and thus answer the questions of theists in advance. Explaining the last view of Rowe in this regard, the answers of Western scholars and also Muslim philosophers and writers who have reasoned against Rowe's reasoning or what can be said to answer him, are investigated and I will show that the collection of those cases can be as a response to Rowe who claimed the evidences of theists in the problem of evil is not justifiable; although they should be updated according to the new presentation of the matter of evil and an answer which is suitable with the new questions and examples should be presented.

William Rowe’s various works on the evidential argument from evil now occupies a central place in the Western discussions on the problem of evil. In one of his formulations, Rowe tries to justify the atheistic belief by showing the likelihood of gratuitous evil’s existence based on some particular instances of intense suffering. However, some of the philosophers, who are called skeptical theists, attempt to show that if there is a God, it is completely rational to accept that the humans are not in a cognitive position to make true judgments about all of the divine intentions and actions. Therefore, we cannot infer God’s justification(s) for the prescription of what seems to us to be an instance of intense suffering. Our aim in this paper is to show that skeptical theism offers a good reason to reject the evidential problem of evil developed by William Rowe.

Argument from religious experience is one of the most important arguments for the existence of God. Contemporary philosopher and theologian, Richard Swinburne, and some of his followers, believe that justification of religious experience is based on two principles, the principle of testimony and the principle of credulity, one of which, the principle of credulity, is criticized by some epistemologists as William L. Rowe. Rowe believes that since in perception, we can distinguish true beliefs from illusory ones by checking procedures, we can use the principle of credulity for perceptual beliefs, whereas in religious experience, since there are no such procedures, we cannot use the principle of credulity.The impossibility of using this principle in religious experience, as Rowe thinks, means that the argument from religious experience is not documented. This article, after formulating the principle of credulity, argument from religious experience, and Rowe’s criticism, tries to defend the principle of credulity against Rowe’s criticism.

The contemporary philosopher of religion, William Leonard Rowe (1931(, with emphasis on gratuitous evil, has tried to show a new version of an evidential argument from evil against God. In this article we, first, try to show a detailed description and documentation of Rowe’s views and, then, have some critical remarks on it. In describing his views, we try to reveal properly the evolution of Rowe’s ideas, according to his critics’ views and his thought reformations. We have shown that the Rowe’s efforts to conclude the existence of actual gratuitous evils from the existence of the some seemingly gratuitous ones is not correct, and that not to find the justification for some evils does not imply that they do not have any plausible justification at all.

If it is not an exaggeration, the biggest problem for solving the problem of consciousness in panpsychism is the combination problem. William Seager, who, according to David Chalmers, was the first to use the term combination for the abovementioned problem, is one of the philosophers of mind who have continuously tried to answer this problem. This article intends to defend Seager’s idea against its flaws and present a more coherent form. The problem of combination by raising the question of how phenomenal states at the level of micro-physical affairs lead to the formation of macro-phenomenal states at the level of macro affairs posed a significant challenge to the perspective of panpsychism. William Seager tries to solve this problem by presenting combinatorial infusion. With the design of “large simple” models, which have the breadth of metaphysical explanation despite their lack of complexity, and by presenting two examples of “large simple” models in the form of classical physics (classical black hole) and quantum (quantum entanglement), He considers the combinatorial infusion as another example of the “large simple” model, which, in parallel with the other two, has the ability to explain the process of phenomenal consciousness. By proposing the form of non-necessary implication between combinatorial infusion and the metaphysical existence of consciousness, Chalmers considers Seager’s answer to be among the non-combined answers or emergent panpsychism. In the following, this study will explain that despite Chalmers’ objection and the fact that his solution is inefficient in the combination problem, combinatorial infusion based on the problem of chemical composition still has the necessary coherence to explain phenomenal consciousness at the macro level.

This paper has two objectives: first, to provide an explanation and analysis of Anselm and Plantinga's ontological argument based on the interpretation of William Rowe, a contemporary atheist, and second, to determine the place of the fallacy of " begging the question" in this argument. After presenting the criticisms of Anselm's interpretation of the argument, Rowe considers Plantinga's modal version to be the most convincing version of the argument and believes that previous interpretations, based on the principle that "existence in reality" is a superior property, are caught in a logical fallacy. Plantinga's interpretation is also based on the premise that God is "a possible being with maximum perfection," and this proposition is true only if God exists in the real world. In this research, using an analytical-critical method, I show that Anselm's interpretation and Plantinga's reconstruction of it are fallacious, and although Plantinga's modal interpretation has logical necessity, it does not prove the necessity of God's existence in the external world. This is because perfection in this argument is defined in a way that falls into the fallacy of "begging the question”.